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Practica) Limits to the European Harmonisation of Waste Policies: the Case of Italy 
Top-down Standards versus 
Bottom-up Learning Processes 
Wie das Beispiel Hausmüllpolitik zeigt, ist die Ähnlichkeit der Umweltpolitiken 
in Europa oft nur oberflächlich; in der Praxis bestimmen weiterhin nationale 
Unterschiede das Bild. Hieran ändert auch eine von der EU „von oben" 
beschlossene Harmonisierung der Standards wenig, solange der für die 
Umsetzung zentrale Implementationsprozeß weiterhin national kontrolliert 
wird. Für eine erfolgreiche Weiterentwicklung der Politik muß daher diese 
„black box" geöffnet werden. Insbesondere ist eine genaue Analyse der 
Akteure und ihrer Interaktion notwendig. Dabei zeigt sich, daß die Diversität 
der nationalen Lösungen auch Vorzüge mit sich bringt, die nur genutzt werden 
können, wenn die Koordination der Politiken den Spielraum der lokalen Akteure 
berücksichtigt. 
A
Von Antonio Massarutto 
t a first glance, it might seem that European 
countries share many similarities with res-
pect to the organization of waste management 
policies, if not in the quality of environmental 
policy objectives and the level of their achieve-
ment. For example there exists a national legisla-
tion that determines general objectives (e.g. prio-
rity ladders, self-sufficiency) and performance 
standards (e.g. emission limits, technical require-
ments of landfills, minimum recycling rates for 
packaging materials). This is increasingly subsu-
med into an European set of standards and rules. 
Furthermore in all countries, legislative standards 
are translated into a definite policy through the 
planning process that is usually carried on at the 
regional level - though the definition of „region" 
is not always the same. Regional plans normally 
deal with recycling targets, number and typology 
of disposal facilities, measures for handling cer-
tain waste flows; municipalities and other waste 
producers have to arrange their disposal activities 
according to targets and limitations set up in the 
plan and so on. 
These broad similarities might induce the false 
perception that waste management policies work 
more or less in the same way in different coun-
tries, in a rather „top-down" manner; the decisive 
input would be the legislative one, therefore diffe-
rences in performance would depend largely on 
the different set of environmental targets that each 
country pursues. An indirect consequence of this 
reasoning is that if it is recognized that asymme-
tric waste management policies might cause 
undesired spill-over effects among countries, the 
solution might be to search for an harmonisation 
of environmental policy targets inspired by new 
common legislation (e.g. arising from the EU 
level). Each national system, as a „black box" 
working in a largely similar way, would achieve 
autonomously these common targets. 
As we try to show in this contribution, however, 
this might not be the case. Despite superficial 
similarities, institutional systems for managing 
waste differ very much among countries, and this 
difference is better appreciated through a positi-
ve analysis of the decision-making system. 
If we compare European countries, we realise 
that, while actors are broadly the same every-
where, the relations between them, and especially 
the „division of labour" among them, are very dif-
ferent. In this sense, the same normative inputs 
(e.g. the imposition of a common standard for, 
say, plastics recycling or sulphur emissions) 
might lead to completely different outputs in 
terms of achieved targets of environmental policy. 
In fact, the strategy adopted by the European Com-
mission has been to search for a gradual com-
promise around harmonised policy targets, there-
fore acting basically through the legislative input. 
With a series of directives starting from the 70s, 
the EC has increasingly tried to set up a common 
legislative framework to be adopted by member 
countries, and basically involving minimum stan-
dards to achieve - and later on maximum stan-
dards aimed at avoiding cross-national externali-
ties. Yet after more than 20 years of common 
waste management policy, a convergence of natio-
nal trajectories is largely unachieved. 
• Why convergence is unachieved 
A first explanation of this fact is the relative 
strength of national enforcement systems with 
respect to waste generation, collection and dis-
posal. The main point is that, first, each national 
system faces different structural and institutional 
problems in setting up an effective monitoring 
and enforcement system; second, and even more 
important, enforcement is normally controlled at 
the local level, and is typically asymmetric, in the 
sense that local operators, well-rooted in the ter-
ritory, often in public hands, usually enjoy a bet-
ter treatment than „foreign" operators; due to 
this asymmetry, the local policy arena remains 
largely impermeable to the standards imposed 
from upper levels of the administration; large 
firms with better technologies might face diffi-
culty in the penetration of the market that 
remains dominated by local operators with poor 
quality standards but more able to „capture" 
regulation at the enforcement stage or to adapt 
and postpone the achievement of general targets. 
This consideration leads to a very clear policy 
implication: instead of concentrating attention 
on the improvement of legislative targets, policy-
makers should concentrate on the bottleneck of 
control and enforcement and guarantee at least 
a homogeneity of treatment among different 
waste management operators. 
A second, and perhaps broader, explanation, 
considers more explicidy the implementation 
process, starting from the consideration that 
each local system has largely specific aims with 
respect to waste management objectives; each 
administrative level having a stake in the imple-
mentation process normally enjoys an inelimina-
ble degree of autonomy and degrees of freedom. 
Each „local" system, therefore, is able to avoid 
and/or adapt nationally-imposed targets if these 
are posing an excessive stress on the system, or 
simply if the local system can go on with its own 
resources - eventually with some „protectio-
nism", e.g. bans on import of waste in order to 
maintain landfill capacity for longer time. 
In other words, despite the fact that waste mana-
gement is formally designed in the institutional 
setting as a hierarchically-dominated top-down 
decision process, real institutional organisation 
- that is, who actually takes relevant decisions 
and enacts them - works in a much more decen-
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tralised way, in a bottom-up fashion. Attention 
must be concentrated on the real functioning of 
the waste management system (WMS), intended 
as a network of actors with mutual relations and 
usually conflicting targets, whose „collective 
action" is ultimately the engine of policy definiti-
on and implementation. 
In this perspective, a far more relevant issue 
becomes to analyse the structure of these relati-
ons within the whole WMS, together with the 
dynamics of co-operation and collective lear-
ning, together with the balance of costs and 
benefits between different areas, and between 
local, regional and national levels. National, and 
a-fortiori European policies cannot be concei-
ved as a purely impositive administrative decisi-
on; and better results are probably achieved if 
policymakers concentrate on the aim of creating 
a setting that encourages local actors to sponta-
neously behave in a certain manner, rather than 
trying to impose targets from outside without a 
true capacity to have them implemented. 
• From a normative 
to a positive analysis 
If we analyse more in deep the functioning of 
each country, we might realize that the WMS 
results from the interaction of a number of 
actors. Each of them has only a limited set of 
resources and available actions, has an imper-
fect knowledge, has an inherited power that 
depends on the role that it has played in the 
system in the past. The key idea is that environ-
mental regulation does not fall onto a „black 
box": rather, it is converted into a definite policy 
through many steps, and each step is constrai-
ned by other concurrent problems: 
• the ned to provide a good service to the city 
(rapidly eliminate waste from the streets) might 
conflict with the target of improved recycling 
rates; 
• the need to control expenditure for public 
services and reach efficiency might contrast with 
the requirement of an improved environmental 
quality of waste management; 
• the effectiveness and efficiency of waste mana-
gement operation depends crucially on the qua-
lity of inputs (technologies, specialised services 
etc) that the operator acquires on the market, 
and therefore the degree of competitiveness in 
the industrial organisation chain. 
Mutual influences among actors ultimately deter-
mine the existing equilibrium and the dynamic 
evolution of the system; patterns of conflict or 
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co-operation among them highly influence the 
way the system works, the pursuit of priorities, 
and vicious or virtuous circles that accelerate or 
prevent the system's evolution. 
Among the most important aspects that might 
influence the structure of the WMS, we can men-
tion the dialectical relation between local and 
upper levels, the division of responsibilities bet-
ween the public and the private sector, the even-
tual presence of an affiance between operators 
and manufacturers in support of certain techno-
logies (e.g. waste-to-energy), the pressure of 
public opinion and of environmental movements 
on the political and on the productive system. 
According to the different mix of these and other 
variables, we can detect quite a wide number of 
waste management systems. Actually, it is not 
correct to consider the waste problem as affec-
ting all areas in the same way and degree. Right 
to the contrary, within each nation and even wit-
hin each regional area problems might differ 
very much and locally-perceived priorities can 
differ as well. Just one example for this: 
Shortage of disposal sites, for example, is not the 
same everywhere. UK is an example, but also in 
many areas of France, Italy and Greece it is 
usually not so difficult to individuate areas for 
building new landfills. Reasons for „shortage" 
are also different: in some cases - possibly a 
very few ones - the problem is physical shorta-
ge; in most other cases, the problem is the 
unreadiness of the social and economic environ-
ment to bear the external costs „close to their 
backyards"; again, the social conflict is managed 
in many different ways, and European countries 
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show us plenty of examples of successful relati-
ons allowing a sound long-term acceptability of 
landfilling practices, as well as cases where the 
„not in my backyard"-syndrome has been so 
acute that even building a very small landfill for 
inerts proved to be impossible. 
• A panorama of approaches 
„Better an egg today than a hen tomorrow", says 
an universal proverb. In fact, being waste mana-
gement - and particularly end-of-pipe disposal 
with hard technology - typically a sunk-cost 
industry, policymakers and operators are always 
facing the issue whether solving short-term pro-
blems with maybe non-optimal technologies in 
the long run, or put a bet on the future capacity 
to solve problems in a more efficient way, but 
being at risk of postponing the solutions of 
today's problems. 
Waste disposal planning in the past has often 
tried to implement a „one-best-way" solution 
based on the centralisation at the regional/pro-
vincial scale of treatment operations, in order to 
reach economies of scale. 
In fact, the effectiveness of this strategy has not 
been the same everywhere. It is influenced by 
• the relative strength of different layers of 
government (inherited by history); 
• the tradition of co-operation among nearby 
municipalities (and especially among chieftowns 
and surrounding areas) and 
• the higher or lower propensity to delegate 
operation to specialised organisations - or even 
private firms. 
The final equilibrium has been very different. In 
some cases - e.g. Germany, Netherlands - the 
transfer of responsibility has been almost total: 
disposal sites are controlled by inter-municipal 
or provincial bodies, and municipalities are 
more or less obliged to use these plants. In other 
cases - e.g. France - a similar result has been 
reached through the intermediation of private 
firms, even if each municipality formally conti-
nues to be autonomous. In still other cases - e.g., 
Italy - regional plans have never been imple-
mented, at least not fully, municipalities continue 
to rely on themselves and the plan is, in fact, 
much more concentrated on the governing of 
short-term trade of waste between areas rather 
than on the provision of collective facilities. 
However, this might not turn as a disadvantage 
for the Italian system. While regional efforts 
aimed at imposing a common strategy have fai-
led, local systems have been forced to look for 
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solutions themselves, and this has often led to 
innovative and original solutions. Communal 
associations reaching 60-70 percent of recyc-
ling targets, for example, are not so infrequent; 
and their typical way of organising the system 
avoids centralised operations and integrated 
firms; rather, it involves specialisation (e.g. 
firms specialised in the processing of definite 
waste categories) and a highly dynamic division 
of labour between small and medium firms. 
• A follower s problem 
Given these circumstances, a very difficult choice 
has to be made, especially by countries like Italy 
or Greece, where landfllling is still dominant: 
On one side, there is the concrete option of „sta-
ge-skipping", that is: avoiding the need of large 
and centralised sunk-cost facilities by moving 
direcdy from the „everything in landfill" strategy 
to very high and ambitious recycling rates. 
On the other side, this strategy might reveal to be 
very risky, particularly for areas that are experi-
encing waste-related stress, or are still using 
environmental unfriendly solutions. At the 
beginning of the 90s, for example, many cities in 
Northern Italy have seen disposal costs rising 
dramatically (from 20-30 Euro / ton to even ten 
times more), either because of the rent they had 
to pay to the owners of nearby plants, or becau-
se of the transport costs necessary for reaching 
cheaper facilities. At the same time, in Southern 
Italy and Greece, while technicians discuss 
about the potential of stage-skipping, bad quali-
ty landfills - and even uncontrolled dumping -
still remain the dominant practice. 
• Conclusion 
In the end, our analysis shows that waste 
management police is - and largely continues 
to be - a matter of local politics and manage-
ment, increasingly being affected by common 
regulations. While the aim of these regulations 
in the past has been a gradual improvement of 
minimum standards, in more recent times the 
issue of reciprocal externalities has entered 
the political agenda. In this sense, the problem 
is not simply that of ensuring a minimum 
common standard, but also that of preventing 
strategies carried on in a local context from 
hampering waste management policies in 
other areas, e. g. by international transfers of 
packaging waste. 
As a result, the waste management policy has 
rapidly changed its aims: from a purely „regula-
tory" policy - where the object of control was 
the compliance with the law - to an increasingly 
„proactive" policy, in which many actors are in 
charge of implementation, and strategies must 
necessarily arise independently from a wide 
number of subjects, beyond the capacity of con-
trol of the public administration. 
As the previous section shows, implementing a 
waste management policy - especially when this 
is intended as an „active" strategy, aiming at 
governing materials flows rather than at a pure-
ly ,,end-of-pipe" approach - is not simply a mat-
ter of rules and enforcement. 
Therefore, it might be naive to retain that asym-
metries in the environmental performance of EU 
countries is simply a matter of, first, less ambi-
tious policy targets and, second, poor enforce-
ment of existing rules. In other words, it is sim-
plistic to think that the inefficiencies and 
ineffectiveness of the monitoring and sanctio-
ning system is the guilty, and that it could be suf-
ficient to replace it with an „European enforce-
ment agency" or anything similar in order to 
achieve better performances. 
Waste management is a typically „loosely-coup-
led" decision-making system, and we cannot 
reduce it to a simple and mechanical hierarchi-
cal organisation working on the base of com-
mand and control. Improving waste manage-
ment practices - especially if this means a 
gradual shift from the traditional ,,end-of-pipe" 
strategy to one concentrated on the optimisation 
of materials flows - is not simply a matter of 
environmental policy: rather, it requires a co-
ordinated policy action on the industrial 
systems. In each country, the structure of the 
WMS is likely to react in very different ways to 
policy measures. Therefore an environmental 
and industrial policy in this sector should start 
from a careful consideration of the structure of 
the WMS and of the dynamic relations that 
govern its evolution, in order to maximise the 
potential for virtuous circles and minimise the 
vicious ones. 
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